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14 October 1965

SUBJECT: INFILTRATION AND LOGISTICS -- SOUTH VIETNAM

THE PROBLEM

The object of this study is to assess the nature and amount of the support being provided to the Communist military forces and the population under Communist control in South Vietnam, including the manner in which supplies and personnel are provided both from inside and from outside South Vietnam by land and by water.

SUMMARY

A. The generally rugged terrain of South Vietnam offers an excellent environment for Communist infiltration of men and supplies from adjoining areas and for clandestine movement within the country. The long seacoast with its many sheltered landing areas and the extensive inland water network also expedite infiltration movements. Within South Vietnam the terrain for the most part enables the Viet Cong to move supplies about quite freely using primitive transport and makes government interception of Viet Cong traffic very difficult. (Paras. 1-4)

B. The People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party of South Vietnam is responsible for the complex task of providing funds for the Viet Cong war effort and of providing most of the essential, non-military goods

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required. The Finance and Economic Section of the Party is the basic economic organization of the Viet Cong and the source of almost all supplies provided internally and some of those provided externally. As the principal unit in the internal Viet Cong logistic network, the Finance and Economic Section works closely with the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong military organization and with the various organizations of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV). The Viet Cong have developed a complex system of economic operations, including taxation, self-initiated economic activities, seizure, and clandestine operations, all of which are aimed toward the goal of acquiring financial and material resources in South Vietnam for their military effort. In terms of actual receipts, taxation is probably the most important source of financial and material support which the Viet Cong have developed. Agricultural, plantation, transportation, and business taxes are imposed on a wide scale through Viet Cong-controlled areas of the country. Bond drives, monetary issues, and clandestine fund drives also represent significant sources of local currency.

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Clandestine front business operations in areas controlled by the government of South Vietnam are concerned primarily with the acquisition of manufactured goods that are imported into South Vietnam through the port of Saigon and other coastal ports. (Paras. 5-12)

C. The external sources of supplies provided to the Viet Cong are principally Communist China, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and France. The countries through which most of these supplies pass

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immediately before infiltration into South Vietnam are North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, although direct shipments to the South Vietnamese coast from other countries are possible. US-produced munitions and supplies have also reached the Viet Cong through capture or sale in South Vietnam. Military supplies that are moved via North Vietnam usually are transported by rail through Kwangsi Province, China, into North Vietnam. Although it is possible that war materiel is moved into Haiphong by merchant ship, no such shipments have been detected. For the most part, supplies for the Viet Cong that move from Cambodia arrive in Cambodia through normal commercial channels, principally aboard Free World ships. Very few ships from Communist countries call at Sihanoukville. The total tonnage they deliver is relatively small and the bulk of it consists of non-military supplies. Since 1963 there have been only about 10 Communist military deliveries to Cambodia. Most of this equipment was used to rearm Cambodian military units. (Paras. 13-15)

D. The Viet Cong are dependent on the countryside and on the rural population for most of their food supplies. In areas where food is not plentiful, Viet Cong food production units engage directly in agricultural activity. Because of the mild weather conditions clothing is not a major problem and Viet Cong requirements for clothing and other textile products are not extensive. The Viet Cong medical system is reasonably effective for the present level of fighting. Medical supplies are purchased on the open market in South Vietnam, captured from South Vietnamese government stocks, or procured from various Communist and Free World countries through Cambodia and North Vietnam. Viet Cong

requirements for POL products probably are quite small and for the most part are obtained internally by seizure or purchase. Viet Cong requirements for construction materials are unknown although most simple construction in base areas can be accomplished by the use of locally available materials. The quantities of weapons, explosives, and ammunition available to the Viet Cong are also unknown, but it is quite clear that substantial quantities of Soviet and Eastern European and Chinese Communist copies of these weapons have been infiltrated into the country. This flow of infiltrated weapons has enabled the Viet Cong to achieve some progress in weapons standardization within priority units. The present emphasis in local manufacture seems to be on the reloading of ammunition, rather than on the production of rifles and more complicated weapons. The largest single source of telecommunications equipment used by the Viet Cong consists of US-manufactured tactical radio sets captured from South Vietnamese army units. (Paras. 16-23)

E. The overland supply of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies from North Vietnam through Laos apparently takes place over a major corridor within which there are at least two distinct routes. Both of these routes end in a series of seasonal roads and trails leading to forward supply points from which supplies are moved across the South Vietnamese border principally by means of porters and bicycles. The main link in the higher capacity route is route 23 -- a seasonal road that permits trucks to move from the Mu Gia Pass at the border of North Vietnam to the Ban Dong area of Laos. From December 1964 through May 1965, when the road was truckable, the level of traffic moving south on route 23 averaged 17 trucks per day each of which carried at least

2 tons. ^{1/} During the 1965 dry season truck traffic on route 23 delivered into Laos at least 20 tons per day in excess of the amount required during that time of the year by Communist troops deployed in the area of Laos south of route 12. Although the disposition of the excess tonnage delivered during the dry season is unknown, it is believed that a significant part of the excess (perhaps as much as 15 tons per day) was stockpiled on the Laotian side of the border to meet the needs of the Communist troops in this area of Laos during the rainy season. A portion of the remaining 5 tons per day brought in during the dry season (about 2.5 tons per day on an annual basis) was available for infiltration into South Vietnam. The lower capacity route, consisting in part of trails that extend around the end of the Demilitarized Zone, provides a shorter, more secure access to forward supply dumps in Laos. Reports of porter movements on these trails have been received only sporadically. Although there have not been enough of these reports to estimate with confidence the amount of supplies moving by this means, analysis of available data indicate that no more than 2 tons per day are actually being delivered over the trails. (Paras. 24-28)

F. Route 92 south of Ban Dong acts as a funnel for supplies delivered over both route 23 and over the trail system west of the Demilitarized Zone. This portion of route 92 has been developed by the Communists into a north-south main supply route from which at least three partially truckable feeder routes lead to forward supply depots and

^{1/} Tonnages are given in short tons and mileages in statute miles throughout this report.

border-crossing points. Further south road construction is under way to connect the end of route 92 with a fourth route that is a seasonally truckable road leading to the South Vietnamese border. The total quantity of supplies moved south on route 92 and on the feeder routes to forward supply dumps cannot be estimated because traffic on route 92 has been observed only near its southern end. Although it is impossible to estimate the quantity of supplies actually crossing the border on a daily basis, about 5 tons per day could be moved over the difficult terrain in the area if 2,000 porters were engaged in cross-border delivery. Continuing Communist emphasis on the improvement of the route 92 supply corridor through Laos, however, will undoubtedly improve the capability of the Communists to move supplies into South Vietnam during the coming months. (Paras. 29-33)

G. The trucks moving south on routes 23 and 92 and the porters coming over the trails from the DMZ carried such items as weapons, ammunition, gasoline, clothing, food, medical supplies, and unidentified cargo. It is not known how far into South Vietnam some of these supplies are carried. The infiltration routes through Laos and into the three northernmost provinces of South Vietnam apparently are under North Vietnamese control. Within South Vietnam, however, Military Region V Headquarters appears to share in the control of the routes in the northern provinces and is probably the major controlling authority throughout the rest of Military Region V. As of mid-1964 about 1,700 to 2,000 men possibly were maintaining the transportation corridor through Laos and another 3,000 or more were maintaining the route in the northern part

of South Vietnam, exclusive of coolies. The extent to which this porter system is functioning at present and the methods and number of men being used are not known. However, the entire Laotian border adjoining the South Vietnamese provinces of Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Kon-tum is interlaced with trails, many of which are probably being used. Pinpointing specific border-crossing points is almost impossible, however, due to lack of information. (Paras. 34-38)

H. From 1959 through 20 September 1965, about 47,700 personnel are believed to have infiltrated from North Vietnam to South Vietnam mainly by land. While moving on the trails through Laos, the infiltrators carried such supplies as medicines, radios, and various types of weapons. Assuming that this portion of the trip required about 30 days, the weight of the food consumed by the infiltrators was about equal to the weight of the supplies they could have carried into South Vietnam. (Paras. 39-41)

I. The Communists have also used seaborne infiltration to transport men and supplies into South Vietnam, but primary emphasis has been on the infiltration of supplies. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The embarkation points in North Vietnam, the landing areas in South Vietnam, and the routes used by the infiltration boats have varied according to the type of mission, the type of craft, and the season of the year. Small junks and sampans have reportedly engaged in infiltration from North Vietnam to the northern provinces of South Vietnam, whereas larger craft have

reportedly carried supplies to many points along the southern coast, roughly south of the 10th Parallel. (Paras. 42-46)

J. At least seven major North Vietnamese organizations reportedly have been closely associated with seaborne infiltration of supplies into South Vietnam. The most important of these

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is known to control at least 24 craft, at least five of which are probably large, steel-hulled vessels, the precise number of craft under its control is unknown. (Paras. 47-49)

K. Many types of ships and small craft have been used in infiltrating supplies into South Vietnam, including wooden junks and sampans, small steel-hulled ships, and possibly oceangoing freighters. Since at least 5 to 10 percent of the 50,000 commercial craft registered with the South Vietnamese government are off the coast on any given day, the problems involved in detecting any planned infiltration movements are formidable. Infiltrating junks can cover their activity by mingling with coastal traffic or remaining well out to sea and making landfalls with the fishing fleets as they make their normal daily movements. (Paras. 50-51)

L. The types of military supplies that have entered South Vietnam by sea have included weapons, ammunition, food, clothing, and medical supplies. Although available evidence does not permit a precise determination of total shipments moved by sea in any given year, it is possible that the pattern has changed during 1965. The absence of any incidents

involving steel-hulled infiltration ships since February suggests that the Viet Cong may now be using only smaller craft which are more easily concealed. If only 5 small craft, each making one trip a month for 9 months of the year, were directly involved in sea infiltration to South Vietnam, and if each craft carried only 8 tons of supplies, a total of 360 tons could be transported during the year, or approximately one ton per day on an annual basis. (Para. 52)

M. Some supplies for the Viet Cong have entered South Vietnam from Cambodia. Most of these supplies were either indigenous to Cambodia or arrived in Cambodia through normal trade channels. Many points along the Cambodian border have been reported as Viet Cong border crossings, but the relative importance of each area or route cannot be determined. In-land water transport, particularly on the Mekong-Bassac River complex, apparently has been one of the major means of infiltrating supplies from Cambodia. Land routes have also provided access at many points for Viet Cong cadres, supporters, or purchasing agents to obtain supplies as necessary. Evidence exists that before crossing the border the porters have left the roads and fanned out onto trails to portage their loads. Some materials have also been infiltrated from Cambodia by sea to the western coast of South Vietnam. It appears that the Viet Cong shift back and forth from land to water transport and from one border area to another as the need and tactical situation change. The infiltration of supplies from Cambodia is under the control of the Viet Cong Peoples Revolutionary Party apparatus in the border area. (Paras. 53-58)

N. It appears that supplies procured in or through Cambodia have generally consisted of materials that can be purchased on the open market, although some arms and ammunition may also have been procured clandestinely. Evidence indicates that Viet Cong units in the border area have on occasion obtained food from Cambodian markets and that the Viet Cong apparatus in Cambodia has procured drugs, medical supplies, radios, batteries, and tubes, and has also solicited funds from the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia. However, the supplies and funds thus obtained are small compared with those obtained by the Viet Cong within South Vietnam. It is clear that the Viet Cong formerly obtained certain chemicals, such as potassium chlorate, in Cambodia, but it is not certain that the infiltration of these supplies continues. The extent to which Cambodia is used as a transfer area or as a source of arms and ammunition is less clear. It is believed, however, that arms movements probably are small in terms of the total amount of such materials infiltrated into South Vietnam. (Paras. 59-62)

O. There is considerable evidence that the Viet Cong have used Cambodian territory in some areas along the 600-mile border for sanctuary and bivouac purposes for varying periods of time. There is also some evidence that they have established temporary military facilities in Cambodia. There is no question that the Cambodian government has taken an attitude increasingly favorable to the Communists in the Vietnamese situation. There is no hard evidence, however, that the central Cambodian government has actively or knowingly provided logistic support to the Viet Cong other than a gift of medical supplies. At lower Cambodian

government and military levels there is evidence of varying degrees of cooperation with the Viet Cong. In some areas along the border the local Cambodian authorities apparently make no effort to interfere with Viet Cong activities and even actively support them. In other areas, however, the Cambodians have tried to police the border against Viet Cong as well as South Vietnamese troops. Central government policy, while generally favorable to the Viet Cong, stops short of active support. (Paras. 63-67)

P. The internal Viet Cong logistics network handles both infiltrated supplies and locally produced goods. At every major echelon of the Party, the Viet Cong have a route-protection or communications-liaison section with the mission of establishing, maintaining, and supervising safe corridor routes for the flow of men, material, and messages. Party cadre carry out these duties and supervise the work of the two basic transport organs-- the Rear Services transport units and the Finance and Economic transport units. Special and organic transport units directed by the Rear Services Section are found at all military echelons. Under military region or Central Office control, special military transport units are primarily engaged in the receipt and initial redistribution of infiltrated supplies. Subordinate to the Rear Services Section of Viet Cong military units, organic transport units provide for the immediate logistics requirements of their units. Transport units of the Finance and Economic Section of the Party are primarily responsible for the transport of locally acquired goods to depots through the recruitment of local civilian labor or through permanently established non-military transport units. (Paras 68-71)

Q. The Viet Cong distribution network within South Vietnam includes an interconnected system of depots and way stations throughout the country. Two major north-south corridors that are joined by east-west lateral routes connect with the base area of the Central Office, South Vietnam, in Tay Ninh Province. The Tay Ninh base is also connected to the delta area by additional corridors. This logistic network depends mainly on primitive land transport, although water transport is used in the delta area. Supply depots are concealed and restricted in size in order to avoid detection, and supplies are moved in stages and handled through as many depots as necessary for their security. The volume of supplies moved on these routes has not been determined. (Paras. 72-76)

I. GENERAL

1. The rugged terrain of South Vietnam offers an excellent environment for the infiltration of supplies from adjoining areas and for clandestine movement within the country. South Vietnam is composed of the Mekong Delta, a coastal lowland, and a highland region. (See the map at Annex.) The delta area is interlaced with about 2,500 miles of navigable canals, rivers, and streams, and more than half of the area is flooded each summer and autumn. The principal streams are 800 to 1,100 feet wide in their upper courses and 2,500 feet to over 1 mile wide in their lower courses. The land adjacent to the streams consists of large areas of marsh and paddy land. Mangrove swamps also line the rivers in some places.

2. The coastal lowland extending northward from the delta plain varies in width from 5 to 30 miles. In some places, spurs of the highlands encroach on the lowlands and serve as potential avenues of ingress to the interior uplands. Where the highlands extend to the sea, many sheltered landing areas are found between the promontories and the steep rocky islands offshore. Between the coastal lowlands and the Mekong Valley lies the highland region, which extends from just northeast of the Mekong Delta northward into North Vietnam. North of about the 14th Parallel the highlands consist mainly of steep mountain ridges with intervening deep, narrow valleys. The southern part of the highlands, however, is a

complex of mountain ranges and scattered plateaus. The mountains, some with peaks above 8,000 feet, and the deeply incised parts of the plateaus make surface transportation difficult.

3. The land boundaries of South Vietnam extend more than 900 miles, all of which adjoin Communist-controlled or unfriendly territory. On the east and south, for a distance of about 1,500 miles, the country fronts on the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. The boundary with Cambodia extends about 600 miles northeastward from the Gulf of Siam, about 460 miles of which is in the delta area and is crossed by numerous rivers and streams that can be used as infiltration routes. The remainder of the boundary with Cambodia crosses forested plains and the hilly-to-mountainous western edge of the Annam Mountains. Established vehicular roads cross the Cambodian border in the delta area and in the forested plains north of Saigon, but the Viet Cong can also use trails to cross the border in numerous places. The entire border with Cambodia is an area of tension because of constant border clashes between the forces of both countries. The boundary with Laos continues generally northward for about 300 miles along the crest of the Annam Mountains. Passage across this boundary is generally tortuous; the best trail crossings and the ones apparently used most by the Viet Cong are in the northernmost part, where the border is hilly rather than mountainous. The demarcation line between North and South Vietnam, about 50 miles long, descends the eastern slope of the Annam Mountains and crosses hills and a narrow coastal plain to the South China Sea. The demilitarized zone extends 3 miles on each side of

the demarcation line. An inoperable railroad and a road cross this line, but normal traffic on these routes has been stopped by military outposts on both sides of the border.

4. Within South Vietnam the terrain for the most part enables the Viet Cong to move supplies about quite freely using primitive transport. Most of the population of South Vietnam lives in villages, principally in the Mekong Delta. The few large towns are mainly in the delta and along the coast. Settlements in the delta are built along the banks of rivers and canals. Numerous small inland water craft provide the major share of transport in this area both for the local populace and for the Viet Cong. In the highlands, villages are located in scattered clearings on high ground. A sparse network of mostly one- to two-lane bituminous-treated roads links the larger settlements and towns. The majority of the settlements, however, are connected by tracks or, at best, by one-lane earth roads or roads that have crushed-stone surfaces. Many villages are linked only by trails. In such terrain the Viet Cong can use porters, bicycles, carts, and occasionally modern vehicles. Poor modern transportation, plus the fact that the Viet Cong can mingle with the local traffic, makes government interception of Viet Cong traffic very difficult.

II. Sources of Supplies and Funds for the Communist Military Forces
and the Population Under Communist Control in South Vietnam

Internal Organization

5. The People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam -- the southern branch of the Communist Party in North Vietnam -- is responsible for the complex task of providing funds for the Viet Cong war effort and of providing most of the essential, nonmilitary goods for the Viet Cong organization. Operating through a vertical series of Party committees which exist on almost all geographical levels from village to the Central Office, South Vietnam, the Party has attempted to develop internal sources of funds and supplies for the war effort. A wide array of front, Party, and military elements -- under the overall direction of the Party -- implement the principal tasks of production, acquisition, and transportation of supplies. The Finance and Economic Section of the Party, the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong military organization, and the various units of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) are the principal instrumentalities in these tasks. The Finance and Economic Section of the Party is the basic economic organization of the Viet Cong and the source of almost all supplies provided internally and some of those provided externally. At the province level and above, each Finance and Economic Section is headed by a policy level Party cadre and includes the chief of the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong main force units. It is the responsibility of the various finance and economic units to supervise the economy of Viet Cong-controlled areas, to acquire the money and goods required by the Viet Cong, and to implement economic programs designed to strengthen Viet Cong economic power and disrupt the economy of South Vietnam.

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6. As the principal unit in the internal Viet Cong logistics network, the Finance and Economic Section works closely with the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong military units and with the various NFLSV organizations. This relationship with the Rear Services Section provides the Finance and Economic Section with a channel for supplying military units with required goods and for calling upon the military for assistance in meeting economic tasks. A similar relationship exists with the NFLSV organizations. The Finance and Economic Section relies on these organizations to supply civilian manpower for the economic tasks of the Party, and, in turn, attempts to meet the requirements of the civilian population by supplying the necessary goods.

Internal Sources

7. The Viet Cong appear to be largely self-sufficient in regard to almost all nonmilitary supplies. Nonmilitary supplies available to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam are indigenous or imported through legal or illegal trade channels. The Viet Cong have developed a complex system of economic operations devoted clearly toward the goal of acquiring financial and material resources in South Vietnam for their military effort. Taxation, self-initiated economic activities, seizure, and clandestine operations appear to be the principal means of obtaining financial and material support for the Viet Cong.

8. In terms of actual receipts, taxation is probably the most important source of financial and material support for the Viet Cong. The US Military Assistance Command Vietnam has estimated that the Viet Cong collect 50 to 100 million piasters per province annually, or about

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US \$30 million to \$60 million per year in all of South Vietnam. 2/ There is insufficient evidence to estimate actual tax collections in cash and in kind, but it is known that the Viet Cong impose agricultural, plantation, transportation, and business taxes on a wide scale throughout the country. Although tax payments are probably the major source of local currency, bond drives, monetary issues, and clandestine fund drives also represent significant sources of local currency.

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There is no specific evidence of a Viet

Cong shortage of local currency, and in fact there have been unconfirmed reports that the Viet Cong are building a fund surplus to meet the costs of administering additional areas that may come under their control.

9. Agricultural taxation is probably the most important source of Viet Cong tax receipts. During the past crop year the Viet Cong employed progressive tax schedules on agricultural income with as many as 25 separate rates in the Mekong delta region alone. If these rates had been

2/ This range is intended to be a rough approximation of internally acquired Viet Cong resources. In comparison, central government revenues in 1964 totalled about \$175 million, mainly from indirect taxes and customs duties collected in the Saigon metropolitan area. South Vietnamese piasters were converted to US dollars at the rate of exchange of 73.5 piasters to US \$1.

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applied only to rice production in Viet Cong-controlled areas of the delta, the collection of rice would have amounted to nearly 90,000 short tons, an amount far in excess of Viet Cong requirements in the delta or even on a national basis. ^{3/} Because equivalent Viet Cong tax rates are applied to other agricultural production in the delta, it is estimated that the Viet Cong collect far in excess of their nationwide requirements for food in the delta alone. In the central part of the country agricultural tax collections cannot be calculated because the tax has not been applied as systematically or as comprehensively as in the Mekong delta area. However, there is little doubt that even in this area the agricultural tax supplies a significant portion of Viet Cong needs for rice, salt, manioc, fish, and other foodstuffs. In addition, in this area the Viet Cong often purchase or confiscate rice and salt.

10. Plantation taxes -- either in money or in kind -- also account for a significant portion of Viet Cong tax receipts. Rubber plantations close to war zones C and D (see map at Annex) provide an important means of supply for Viet Cong forces in these areas; these plantations possess large stocks of rice, medicine, POL, and other supplies and have long been vulnerable to Viet Cong economic pressure. According to a recent captured document, the annual plantation tax is approximately

^{3/} During January through August, rice deliveries to Saigon from the delta totaled about 650,000 tons in 1963, 440,000 tons in 1964, and 340,000 tons in 1965. It is possible that Viet Cong tax collections account for most of this so-called shortfall of deliveries to Saigon. There have been persistent reports that the Viet Cong are smuggling rice into Cambodia to acquire foreign exchange or otherwise generate funds for their effort. However, the amount of rice actually disposed of through Cambodia is not known.

1,000 piasters (\$13.70) per hectare (2.47 acres) or a total of about \$1 million for the potentially exploitable area of 75,000 hectares if subject to Viet Cong taxation. Wage taxes on plantation workers and Viet Cong demands for labor service for transportation are also known to exist on a wide scale. Most of the internal transportation of the country, both personal and commercial, is also taxed by the Viet Cong, although it is impossible to estimate total receipts in cash and kind from this source. Taxes are also imposed on business establishments and commercial activities whenever possible. Small rice and sugar mills are taxed in areas outside of the control of the government of South Vietnam; woodcutters, charcoal kilns, and sawmills are generally easy prey for the Viet Cong. Import and export taxes are levied against trade between areas controlled by the Viet Cong and areas controlled by the central government in order to provide revenue and to promote a favorable trading pattern for the Viet Cong. Thus the import of medicines, cloth, POL, and printing supplies into areas controlled by the Viet Cong is not taxed at all, but the export of metal from Viet Cong areas is forbidden completely.

11. Despite the considerable financial and material resources available to the Viet Cong through tax collection and other financial operations such as bond drives, monetary issues, and the use of credit cooperatives, additional economic activities have been initiated to support Viet Cong military personnel and the civilian population under Viet Cong control. For example, major efforts to produce their own foodstuffs, especially rice and manioc, have been made by the Viet Cong in the central highlands. Units to produce clothing have been

established as subordinate elements of the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong military organization. Simple manufacturing units, which produce farm implements for the civilian population, also produce military goods such as mines, grenades, and rifles. Where materials are not ordinarily available through other means, they are often seized outright, although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between seizure through force and enforced tax collections. However, the Viet Cong do accumulate significant supplies as war booty, including medicines, communications equipment, foodstuffs, and military equipment.

12. Clandestine front business operations in areas controlled by the government of South Vietnam and involvement of legitimate enterprises in Viet Cong procurement operations are considered to be common in many provinces. These operations do not provide revenue, but procure essential supplies for the Viet Cong from areas controlled by the central government. Although these clandestine operations are used for the acquisition of indigenous goods, these operations are probably concerned primarily with the acquisition of manufactured goods that are imported into South Vietnam through the port of Saigon and other coastal ports. Private firms and individuals import and distribute key items such as POL, medicines, textiles, printing supplies, batteries, cement, and steel products. At the lowest level, the Viet Cong use the civilian population under their control to make discreet purchases of these goods. In district and provincial capitals, it is widely suspected that the Viet Cong operate clandestine front businesses or use legitimate enterprises as witting or unwitting agencies for procurement. For example, a French

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rubber plantation recently purchased a substantial quantity of medical supplies in Saigon and participated in a pre-arranged Viet Cong raid on the plantation to accomplish transfer of these goods.

External Sources

13. The external sources of supplies provided to the Viet Cong are principally Communist China, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and France. The countries through which most of these supplies pass immediately before infiltration into South Vietnam are North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, although direct shipments to the South Vietnam coast from other countries are possible. US-produced munitions and supplies have also reached the Viet Cong through capture or sale in South Vietnam.

14. Military supplies that are moved via North Vietnam usually are transported by rail through Kwangsi Province, China, into North Vietnam. Until early 1965 the International Control Commission (ICC) observers were permitted to read the manifests but were not permitted to inspect the contents of the freight cars that moved into North Vietnam from China through Dong Dang. After the bombing of North Vietnam began and the ICC observers were pulled back to Hanoi in early 1965, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] two military trains per day obviously loaded with many kinds of war materiel moved into North Vietnam. Although this materiel undoubtedly was destined for the forces of the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN), supplies for the Viet Cong apparently are taken from PAVN storage areas. Reports are also available indicating that military supplies have been moved from China by junk or small coastal ships to various points along the North Vietnamese coast. Although it is possible

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that war materiel is moved into Haiphong by merchant ship, no such shipments have been detected. Information on the cargo carried by the 425 foreign merchant ships that called at Haiphong during 1964 is not complete. However, about 175 of the ships were owned by Bloc countries, and a considerable number of the Free World ships calling there were chartered to Bloc countries. [REDACTED] some merchant ships have unloaded cargo into junks and other small craft before entering the port of Haiphong. Such cargo could have been destined for sea infiltration into South Vietnam, much of which seems to originate in the Haiphong area.

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15. For the most part, supplies for the Viet Cong that move from Cambodia arrive in Cambodia through normal commercial channels, principally aboard Free World ships. Very few ships from Communist countries call at Sihanoukville, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The total tonnage is relatively small and the bulk of it consists of non-military supplies. No more than 10,000 tons of cargo were delivered by Bloc ships to Sihanoukville from the USSR and East Europe in the first half of 1965. During the same period a single Chinese Communist ship made three calls. [REDACTED]

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Since 1963 there have been only about 10 Communist military deliveries to Cambodia. The items delivered have ranged from spare parts and

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ammunition to MIG aircraft, but there has been no effort by Cambodia, Communist China, or the USSR to conceal these deliveries, and Prince Sihanouk has provided a detailed breakdown of the weapons supplied. Although it is impossible to trace the disposition of each rifle or machinegun delivered to Cambodia, [] this equipment is used to rearm Cambodian units, and that the units are required to account accurately for the weapons and ammunition involved. It seems unlikely, therefore, that any significant amount of this new equipment or ammunition has been supplied to the Viet Cong, although some of the replaced equipment may have been turned over to them. The weapons and ammunition that reportedly have been shipped to the Viet Cong through Cambodia may have been smuggled into Cambodia by sampans or junks, or over land routes, or obtained from commercial channels in Cambodia.

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Critical Items of Supply

16. As mentioned above, the Viet Cong are dependent on the countryside and on the rural population for most of their food. Viet Cong taxation policy permits payments in rice, manioc, fish, salt, and other food items. In areas where food is not plentiful, Viet Cong food production units engage directly in agricultural activity. In the mountainous areas particularly, the Viet Cong spend a considerable number of man-days per year in the production of food. According to recently captured documents, prior to June 1963 the Viet Cong military units and administrative agencies were directed by the Central Office, South Vietnam to provide their own subsistence for a period of 4 months per year, with the remaining 8 months of subsistence furnished by the Central

Office.

/ From June 1963 to June 1964, all units were required to furnish 100 percent of their own subsistence. Since June 1964, combat units have provided 50 percent of their own food and all other units 100 percent. Some reports have indicated that PAVN battalions operating in the northern part of South Vietnam receive some of their rice supplies from external sources.

17. The Viet Cong requirements for clothing and other textile products, such as hammocks and mosquito nets, are not extensive. Because of the mild weather conditions, clothing is not a major problem. A number of items of clothing used by the Viet Cong, such as khaki uniforms, underwear, winter clothing for the mountain regions, and hammocks, are produced in North Vietnam. For the most part, these items have been issued to infiltrators who generally carry an individual supply of two uniforms, a knapsack, a hammock, and a mosquito net when entering the country. Clothing production units also exist as elements of the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong military organization. In addition the Viet Cong obtain cloth internally by discreet purchase and externally from Cambodian sources.

18. The Viet Cong medical system is reasonably effective for the present level of fighting. Aid stations, hospitals, and rest centers are located within South Vietnam and probably have been located temporarily in Cambodia and Laos from time to time. Approximately 48 of these medical facilities have been identified, some of which are reported to be well-staffed and supplied even with such sophisticated equipment as x-ray machines, laboratory facilities, and dental chairs.

One major source of medical supplies is the open market in South Vietnam. With the exception of opiates and barbiturates, most drugs can be purchased without difficulty in pharmacies in the larger cities. Another major source consists of captured South Vietnamese medical supplies. Some Viet Cong military operations have been specifically directed toward obtaining these supplies from hamlets and supply convoys. Finally, medical supplies are procured from various Communist and Free World countries through Cambodia and North Vietnam.

19. North Vietnam in particular appears to be engaged in building up its supplies of pharmaceuticals. North Vietnamese imports of penicillin and blood plasma -- both of which are widely used in treating battle casualties -- have risen sharply in 1965 and appear to be well in excess of normal requirements. Although other Communist countries have been the predominant suppliers of most pharmaceuticals, Japan has provided virtually all the blood plasma imported by North Vietnam. The actual quantity of pharmaceuticals being shipped from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong is not known, but it is believed to be adequate for their needs. In addition to equipping the PAVN forces now fighting in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese reportedly have used infiltrators to carry small packets of medical supplies containing such items as penicillin, sulfa drugs, and quinine derivatives to the Viet Cong. Because of the relative ease of transporting large quantities of pharmaceuticals, it would be possible for North Vietnam to deliver substantial quantities of medical supplies by small coastal vessels and over the land infiltration routes. Once in South Vietnam these supplies presumably would be stored in central areas near base hospitals.

20. Viet Cong requirements for POL products probably are quite small. They have some organic vehicles and self-propelled craft, however, and also power generators and other power-driven equipment for which they need fuel. Taxation of the contents of petroleum tank trucks, outright seizure of petroleum supplies, and discreet purchase from local gasoline stations throughout the country are known methods of acquisition from internal sources.

21. The requirements of the Viet Cong for construction materials are unknown. Simple construction in base areas probably can be accomplished by the use of locally available materials, mainly timber. Although the Viet Cong have been known to seize convoys carrying supplies of cement, their access to other internal and external sources of construction materials is not known.

22. The Viet Cong supply of weapons, explosives, and ammunition has been accumulated from various sources: supplies buried or left behind by retreating government forces in South Vietnam or Laos; supplies infiltrated primarily through Laos and Cambodia; captured supplies; and locally-produced supplies. The available quantities of these weapons, explosives, and ammunition are unknown, but it is evident that substantial quantities of Soviet and Eastern European weapons and Chinese Communist copies of these weapons have been infiltrated into South Vietnam for use by the Viet Cong. This flow of weapons from outside South Vietnam has enabled the Viet Cong to achieve some progress in weapons standardization within priority units. Nonstandard weapons and those of World War II vintage are being passed on to the guerrillas and other armed militia

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units. The present emphasis in local manufacture seems to be on the reloading of ammunition, rather than on the production of rifles and more complicated weapons. The majority of the Viet Cong production facilities are located south and west of Saigon. Annex A contains a list, by country of origin, of the types of Communist-supplied and locally-produced weapons and ammunition captured by central government and US forces from the Viet Cong.

23. Most of the telecommunications equipment used by the Viet Cong consists of US-manufactured tactical radio sets captured from units of the South Vietnamese army.

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types of radio equipment captured range from handheld, low-power transceivers to relatively large, vehicle-mounted transmitters having power ratings of from 300 to 400 watts. This captured equipment has been augmented to a small extent by comparable equipment of Soviet and Chinese Communist manufacture supplied from North Vietnam, by recently acquired equipment of Japanese manufacture, and by locally manufactured equipment.

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III. LAND INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL FROM NORTH VIETNAM

Supply Routes and Quantities of Supplies Moved

24. There is a scarcity of information on the overland movement of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies from North Vietnam to the northern provinces of South Vietnam. It is apparent, however, that a major corridor from North Vietnam through Laos serves as a principal means of transporting supplies. Within this corridor, there are at least two distinct land routes. Both of these routes end in a series of seasonal roads and trails leading to forward supply points. From these points in Laos, supplies are moved across the South Vietnamese border by means of porters, bicycles, ox carts, or pack animals.

25. The route from Mu Gia Pass via routes 12/23/9/92 is the higher capacity route. This road network is in part useable only in the dry season for through motor transport but it can be used during the remainder of the year by a combination of methods. Its maximum use is from about mid-December through May or June to supply the Communist forces in the southern part of Laos and the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Supplies from North Vietnam are trucked in stages along routes 1A and 15 through Mu Gia Pass into Laos and then south on routes 12 and 23 to supply dumps located along routes 23 and 9. ^{4/} Some supplies moving along this route eventually reach Ban Dong at the junction of routes 9

^{4/} Reports from road-watch teams located near the southern end of route 23 close to route 9 have indicated that many convoys do not move all the way from route 23 to route 9 and that there is a lower level of traffic in this area than along the northern part of route 23.

and 92 and then move down route 92 toward the South Vietnamese border. Although route 23 is a very important portion of this supply line, it is a seasonal road on which truck traffic is restricted from about June through November each year because of flooding and ground softening caused by the southwest monsoons.

26. Before the completion of route 23 in 1962, some supplies for the Communist forces in southern Laos were moved by air. During January-June 1963, however, many large truck convoys were observed moving south on route 23. Although most of these trucks probably carried troops and supplies for the southern part of Laos, some of the supplies may have been portered over the trails into the northern provinces of South Vietnam. Again in 1964 the convoys moved during the dry season only. Observation by road-watch teams was so incomplete in both years that it is impossible to estimate with confidence the volume of supplies moved into the area. As a result of considerably improved reporting by the road-watch teams during the 1965 dry season, however, it is possible to estimate that the level of traffic moving south on route 23 averaged 17 trucks per day. (See Annex B.) Based on observations of the contents of about 10 percent of the trucks moving south, it is believed that they carried at least 2 tons each. It is also believed that the road was truckable for a total of about 180 days during the dry season. This volume of traffic from December 1964 to June 1965 is calculated to have moved about 35 tons of military supplies each day or a total of 6,300 tons into the area of Laos served by route 23.

During the wet season, groups of porters were also observed occasionally moving south on this route. The traffic moving other than by truck, however, is small and intermittent and its volume cannot be estimated.

27. During the 1965 dry season the approximately 8,000 Communist troops stationed in the area of Laos south of route 12 probably required an average of about 15 tons per day of logistic support from outside sources. Since the end of the dry season additional numbers of troops have been observed moving south into this area of Laos. Although the daily requirement for the original 8,000 troops may have declined slightly during the wet season because of a lower level of activity, this decline was probably offset by the additional requirement of the new troops moving into the area, so that the figure of 15 tons per day probably remained valid during the wet season. During the 1965 dry season truck traffic on route 23 probably delivered about 20 tons per day in excess of the troop requirement. Although the disposition of the excess tonnage delivered during the dry season is unknown, it is believed that a significant part of the excess (perhaps as much as 15 tons per day) was stockpiled in military supply dumps on the Laotian side of the border to meet the needs of the Communist troops in this area of Laos during the wet season. 5/ A portion of the remaining 5 tons per day brought in during the dry season (about 2.5 tons per day on an annual basis 6/) was available for infiltration into South Vietnam. It should also be noted that as much as 2 tons of food

5/ It is probable that any stockpiles built up during the 1965 dry season have since been considerably depleted.

6/ The Communists do not move supplies forward every day of the year, but, in order to convey an idea of the average amount available, the total tonnage has been spread throughout the year and expressed on a daily basis.

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per day may be required from sources outside of Laos to support infiltrators and supplement food grown by way station personnel and porters on the Laotian side of the border.

28. The lower capacity supply route from North Vietnam begins with a truck route south from Vinh to the area of the Demilitarized Zone. From this point the route consists of a network of trails, portions of which may be trafficable by light vehicles, that extend around the end of the Demilitarized Zone and cross route 9 near Ban Dong. This route provides a shorter, more secure access to the forward supply dumps in Laos. This route is probably used for infiltration of some critical items of military supply and for infiltration of personnel.

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groups of 100 to 300 coolies carrying supplies south toward Ban Dong over this trail system. Although there have not been enough of these reports to estimate with confidence the amount of supplies moving by this means, analysis of available data indicates that no more than 2 tons per day are actually being delivered over the trails. These porter movements apparently take place during the rainy season, possibly indicating that the trails are used for the most part when trucks cannot move on route 23.

29. Route 92 south of route 9 is the beginning of a supply network that supports Communist activities in the southeastern area of the Laotian Panhandle and across the border into South Vietnam. This route acts as a funnel for supplies delivered over both route 23 and over the trail system west of the Demilitarized Zone. Route 92 extends south from Ban Dong for a distance of about 80 miles and ends at the Se Kong River, about 20 miles east of Saravane. Although the northern section possibly has a low all-season capability, the southern part is truckable only in the dry season. Route 92 south of Ban Dong has been developed by the Communists into a

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north-south main supply route from which at least three partially truckable feeder routes (routes 921, 922, and 923) lead to border-crossing points and forward supply depots. At least one of these routes (922) is an important supply route to South Vietnam. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] indicated that vehicular activity has occurred on route 922 from its junction with route 92 to a point about 15 miles east where route 922 divides into two segments. Each of these 1-to-2 mile segments also showed evidence of recent vehicular activity. Thus it appears that in the dry season supplies can be transported by truck all the way from North Vietnam to a point at least within 5 miles of the border of South Vietnam.

30. From the southern end of route 92 some supplies are moved south in native craft on the Se Kong River to route 165, which is a seasonably truckable route extending east toward the South Vietnamese border through a possible maneuver and training area. An improved trail also generally parallels the Se Kong River and connects the southern terminus of route 92 with route 165.

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[REDACTED] the northern section of this trail was being upgraded into a road at the end of the 1965 dry season. It is likely that the entire trail paralleling the river will be upgraded after the present wet season. When this work is completed the Communists will have a second fair-weather truckable route from route 92 to the South Vietnamese border.

31. The total quantity of supplies moved south on route 92 during the 1965 dry season cannot be estimated because traffic on the road has been observed only near its southern end. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] some trucks leave route 92 north of the observers and move supplies on the feeder routes toward the South Vietnamese border. During February through June 1965 trained observers located about 70 miles south of Ban Dong reported that the level of truck traffic moving near

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the southern end of route 92 averaged about $1\frac{1}{2}$ trucks moving south per day. (See Annex B.) If it is estimated that these trucks carried about 2 tons each, a total of about 375 tons could have been moved south during the dry season. On an annual basis this quantity amounts to a daily average of slightly more than 1 ton that presumably was available to be moved forward from the end of route 92 to Communist forces located farther south in Laos, or along route 165 toward the border of South Vietnam.

32. The best available intelligence indicates that porters are used to carry the bulk of the supplies from the forward depots in Laos across the border into South Vietnam. Although it is impossible to estimate the quantity of supplies actually crossing the border on a daily basis, about 5 tons per day could be moved over the difficult terrain in the area if 2,000 porters were engaged in cross-border delivery. ^{7/} Additional amounts could also be moved by such means of transport as bicycles, carts, and pack animals which are known to have been used by the Viet Cong.

33. It appears that the area adjacent to the route 92 main supply route is equivalent to the Viet Cong/PAVN advanced communications zone containing an interconnecting land and water transportation system, troop facilities, maneuver and training areas, and logistic installations. Continuing Communist emphasis on the improvement of this major supply corridor through Laos, as evidenced in aerial photography of the

^{7/} Some reports have indicated that from 2,000 to 6,000 porters are intermittently engaged in cross-border delivery. If 6,000 persons were actually being used on a continuous basis, then approximately 14 tons per day could be moved across the border.

past year, will undoubtedly improve the capability of the Communists to move supplies into South Vietnam during the coming months.

Types of Supplies Moved

34. The trucks that moved south on route 23 during the 1965 dry season carried such items as ammunition for small arms, mortars, and recoilless rifles; explosives; gasoline; clothing; and foodstuffs such as rice, salt, flour, dried meat, and dried fish. The northbound trucks reportedly carried lumber, bamboo, and salvage items such as empty gasoline drums and tires. The contents of about half of the trucks moving near the southern end of route 92 were not observed, but almost 30 percent reportedly carried boxes, 15 percent a combination of arms, ammunition, and food, and the remainder sacks with unidentified cargo. About a third of the trucks moving north reportedly were empty. Many of the porters coming over the trails from near the western end of the Demilitarized Zone to route 92 or directly to points along the border of South Vietnam are reported to have carried weapons, ammunition, equipment, medical supplies, and foodstuffs. It is not known how far into South Vietnam some of these supplies are carried, but it may be assumed that at least the food carried over the trails would not be moved beyond the mountainous border area.

Organizational Control

35. The infiltration routes through Laos and into the three northernmost provinces of South Vietnam apparently are under North Vietnamese control. However, Military Region V Headquarters in South Vietnam appears

to share in the control of infiltration routes in the northern provinces and is probably the major controlling authority throughout the rest of Military Region V. Several interrogation reports indicate that as of mid-1964 the 70th Transportation Group controlled the porters and infiltrators on the trails through Laos. The 70th Transportation Group is under direct control of the PAVN High Command in Hanoi. This group maintains about 17 communications-liaison stations in Laos, with the first station located near the end of the Demilitarized Zone. A company of about 100 able-bodied men is located at each station to carry out transportation, security, communications, liaison, and guidance of infiltrators and locally conscripted porters. 8/ It is not known whether the supplies transported by truck down route 23 are also the responsibility of the 70th Transportation Group. It is possible that such supplies are turned over to the 70th Transportation Group at the end of the truck route. The 71st Transportation Group was reported to control a short segment of the route between A Rum, a village located near the end of route 922, and some point within Quang Nam Province. It was said to have at least 12 stations, with approximately one company at each station. At the border of South Vietnam near the boundary between Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces the supplies and infiltrators become the responsibility of both the 71st and 72nd Transportation Groups which maintain the communications-liaison route through Quang Nam

8/ The apparent inconsistency between the reports of 100 men at each station and the reports of villagers having observed groups of up to 300 porters on the trails can be explained by the possibility that porters are recruited locally or are moved from one station to another whenever needed for unusually large movements.

to southern Quang Tin Province. The 72nd Transportation Group is reported to have had about 24 stations maintained by a total of 1,700 men. ^{9/} Thus as of mid-1964 about 1,700 to 2,000 men possibly were maintaining the transportation corridor through Laos and another 3,000 or more were maintaining the routes in the northern part of South Vietnam, exclusive of road porters (coolies).

Modes of Transportation and Border Crossing Points

36. Trucks, porters, and native craft on the inland rivers are all used to some extent, depending on the season and location, to bring supplies to the South Vietnamese border. The staged movement by truck from North Vietnam into Laos has been described above. Along the trails the way stations are said to be located about one-half day's march apart. The short distances, anywhere from 4 to 12 miles, depending on terrain and the tactical situation, allow the porters to haul supplies to the next station and return to their home base within one working day. The extent to which this porter system is functioning at present and the methods and number of men being used are not known. An infiltrator captured in June 1965 reported that portions of the trails were being upgraded into roads and that he had seen trucks being used on portions of the route. Apparently he had observed route 922. Other infiltrators who crossed the border in early 1965 observed pack bicycles

^{9/} Current Order of Battle estimates show two Viet Cong units designated as the Binh Son and Nam Son Transportation Groups operating in the northern three provinces. It is possible that these newly reported units represent a reorganization of the previously reported 71st and 72nd Transportation Groups.

more often than porters. The use of bicycles would considerably reduce the number of porters needed. The porters carry loads of 40 to 60 pounds in back packs or on shoulder poles, whereas single or dual bicycles can carry loads of up to 500 pounds. (Annex C lists several additional methods used for packaging and transporting supplies.)

37. Only one waterway in Laos, the Se Kong River mentioned above, is known to be used to any extent as part of an infiltration route, although the alignment of other waterways, the Se Bang Hieng, Se Pone, and the Song Ben Hai, makes them suspect infiltration routes. Aerial photography of the Se Kong between the southern end of route 92 and the point where route 165 leaves the river reveals waterway improvements, native craft on the river, and portages of difficult sections. This waterway is navigable by sampans throughout the year but its use during the dry season probably will be reduced when the road being built parallel to it is completed, possibly by the end of 1965. The Song Ben Hai/Rao Thanh waterway in the Demilitarized Zone forms the border between North and South Vietnam. Although infiltration across this river by teams of three to four men swimming or using small craft has been reported, infiltration of supplies across the river has not been observed. Use by sampans of this waterway throughout the year for lateral movement within the Demilitarized Zone to interior tracks, trails, and tributary streams providing access to South Vietnam is possible, however.

38. Apparently the major border-crossing points (see the map at Annex), consist of the trail networks east and southeast of routes 921, 922, 923, and 165. However, the entire Laotian border adjoining the South Vietnamese provinces of Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Kontum is interlaced with trails, many of which probably are being used. Pinpointing specific border crossing points is impossible due to lack of information. Thick forest coverage of the roads and trails make aerial reconnaissance of these routes difficult. Captured personnel, even the communications-liaison personnel who worked on the routes, lack knowledge of the routes used because of the strict security system applied to the infiltration process.

Infiltration of Personnel

39. Recent information obtained from interrogation of prisoners of war and from a summary of information accumulated since 1959, prepared by the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam, indicates that large numbers of personnel have infiltrated overland from North Vietnam through Laos into South Vietnam. The full scope of the personnel infiltration program, however, cannot be assessed on the basis of the documentary evidence now available. In 1955, following the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the Communists left behind several thousand political activists when they retreated to the north. These political activists remained dormant until 1957 when they commenced various propaganda activities. In 1959 elements of the 70th Transportation Group of the PAVN were sent into an area in southern Laos contiguous to the border of South Vietnam to establish relay stations connecting the southern

part of North Vietnam with the northern area of South Vietnam. Infiltration routes developed over the years from North Vietnam through Laos have become the primary avenues used for the movement of personnel into South Vietnam. It is believed that the 70th Transportation Group remains in control of the infiltration of both men and material from North Vietnam through Laos into South Vietnam.

40. From 1959 through 20 September 1965, about 47,700 men are believed to have infiltrated from North Vietnam to South Vietnam as follows:

<u>Category</u>	<u>1959-60</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>Totals</u>
1-2 <u>a/</u>	4,556	4,118	5,362	4,726	6,301	3,375	28,438
3 <u>b/</u>	26	516	5,842	1,227	1,752	1,595	10,958
4 <u>c/</u>	0	1,661	1,653	1,935	2,340	737	8,326
Totals	<u>4,582</u>	<u>6,295</u>	<u>12,857</u>	<u>7,888</u>	<u>10,393</u>	<u>5,707</u>	<u>47,722</u>

The infiltrators consisted of military, political, security, economic, financial, and education specialists. It is significant that, prior to 1964, essentially all the infiltrators were South Vietnamese who had been

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relocated in North Vietnam after 1954. Since 1964 about half the infiltrators have been native North Vietnamese. The fact that the major elements of a PAVN division are now considered to be south of the 17th Parallel underscores the change in the character of the infiltration program.

41. While moving on the trails through Laos, the infiltrators carried some supplies to South Vietnam. These supplies included medicines, radios, and various types of weapons, such as pistols, grenades, carbines, rifles, machineguns, and recoilless rifles. Sometimes this equipment was not retained by the infiltration group that carried it into South Vietnam. The infiltration trip usually required between 45 days and 4 months. During this time the infiltrators received food from the stations along the way. The weight of the food consumed by the infiltrators while moving through Laos, assuming that this portion of the trip required about 30 days, was about equal to the weight of the supplies that the infiltrators could have carried into South Vietnam.

IV. SEA INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM NORTH VIETNAM

Supply Routes

42. The Communists have used seaborne infiltration to transport men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. The number of personnel infiltrated by sea has been small and the primary emphasis has been on the infiltration of supplies. These supplies are believed to have been used principally to build stockpiles in the coastal areas of South Vietnam for further distribution to the Viet Cong.

43. Vessels engaged in seaborne infiltration have operated out of two general areas in North Vietnam -- in the north, near Haiphong and Bai Chay, and in the south, along the coast between Ben Thuy and the 17th Parallel. Numerous embarkation points and logistic supply bases have been reported. The routes used by infiltration boats have varied according to the type of mission, the type of craft, and the season of the year. Infiltration by sea from North Vietnam reportedly has taken place in past years primarily from December through August, because of the rough seas usually encountered during the rest of the year. One source, who participated in several infiltration missions, mentioned two routes, a "near-shore" route, paralleling the coast at about 3 miles offshore, and a "distant-shore" route, ranging from 50 to 100 miles from the coast.

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Some of the smaller craft involved in infiltration from North Vietnam reportedly have left the northern areas and stopped at ports in the southern area of the country before continuing their trip into South Vietnam. Other craft have transited the Hainan Straits on their way to the south. Some unconfirmed reports state that

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
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seaborne infiltration also has been conducted from foreign ships which have stopped off the coast of South Vietnam while cargo was unloaded into lighters that transferred it to shore.

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44. Seaborne infiltration of supplies and personnel into South Vietnam has taken place at least since 1957. A boat captain, who was captured [redacted] with members of his crew, reported that since 1957 he had worked for an organization that had been engaged in seaborne infiltration into South Vietnam.

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Cong [redacted] captured in 1965 stated that he infiltrated by sea

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in October 1964. He boarded a 70-foot steel-hulled ship at Haiphong, passed through Hainan Straits, sailed near Poulo Condore, Poulo Obi, and then into a stream on the Ca Mau Peninsula. This source indicated that the organization that infiltrated him had made about 20 deliveries to South Vietnam between 1961 and October 1964. In late 1964, an unidentified junk was sighted aground and burning off Kien Hoa Province. Intelligence reports indicated later that this craft was a Viet Cong supply junk that had run aground and been blown up by the Viet Cong to keep her from being captured.

45. Movement of substantial quantities of arms to South Vietnam by larger craft has also been confirmed. In February 1965, a 120-foot steel-hulled ship was discovered and sunk in Vung Ro Bay and a nearby arms cache of about 1,500 weapons and from 40 to 60 tons of supplies and ammunition was seized. This material was probably carried there by ship from North Vietnam. An even larger cache was discovered in April 1965 during a search and destroy operation in Kien Hoa Province.

46. While there is little hard evidence to support many of the reports received, boats or ships have been reported during past years to have unloaded in most of the 21 coastal provinces of South Vietnam. (See the map at Annex.) Most of these landings are reported to have taken place in the four northern coastal provinces of South Vietnam--Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin--and in the southern part of the country from Binh Tuy Province around the Cape of Ca Mau to the Cambodian border, including the offshore island of Phu Quoc. Small junks and sampans have reportedly engaged in infiltration from North Vietnam to the

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northern provinces of South Vietnam, whereas larger craft have reportedly carried supplies to many points along the southern coast of South Vietnam, roughly south of the 10th ~~Parallel~~, with craft waiting offshore until landings could be made under cover of darkness. In this respect it should be noted that shallow water extending well offshore is an impediment to sea infiltration in the southern delta area of South Vietnam.

Organizational Control

47. At least seven major North Vietnamese organizations reportedly have been closely associated with seaborne infiltration of Viet Cong personnel and supplies into South Vietnam. These are (1) the Unification Agency, reportedly in existence from 1956 to 1961; (2) the Ong-Xa Group, reportedly a military organization in existence between 1959 and 1960; (3) the 603rd Special Battalion of the PAVN, reportedly a special maritime infiltration unit stationed south of Gianh River; (4) the Central Research Directorate, the chief intelligence authority reportedly involved in the direction and movement of espionage and intelligence personnel to South Vietnam; (5) [redacted] subordinate to the North Vietnamese Naval High Command; (6) the 103rd Transport Battalion; and (7) the Lao Dong Party/People's Revolutionary Party. The complete absence of reports since 1963 on the first three organizations makes it probable that they have been disbanded, reorganized, or merged with other infiltration organizations.

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Viet Cong captured on 31 May 1965 indicate the possible existence of another large infiltration organization (640 men and 48 junks). This organization, the 103rd Transport Battalion, reportedly has conducted infiltration by rotating operation of its junks in 4 groups of 12 each.

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49. In 1965 an additional method of sea infiltration has been noted. This method consists of the Viet Cong obtaining South Vietnamese ships and crews on a temporary basis by either hiring or coercing owners and personnel. The crews then take the ships to North Vietnam, where supplies are loaded, and the ships then return to South Vietnam. For example, five Viet Cong were captured and ammunition and weapons were recovered

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from a junk engaged in this kind of operation that was scuttled off Quang Tri Province in March 1965. The organization responsible for instigating this type of operation is unknown.

Forms of Sea Transportation Used

50. Many types of ships and small craft have been used in infiltrating supplies into South Vietnam for the Viet Cong, including wooden junks and sampans, small steel-hulled ships, and possibly oceangoing freighters. Some of the North Vietnamese craft involved are apparently faster and better armed than the junks of the South Vietnamese Junk Fleet. The infiltration ship sunk at Vung Ro on 16 February 1965, for example, was a 120-foot, steel-hulled ship with an estimated cargo capacity of 100 tons and a cruising speed of 8 knots. The motorized craft of the Junk Fleet have a speed of only 6 to 8 knots.

51. An additional factor which tends to obscure the sea infiltration situation is the large amount of normal South Vietnamese traffic operating in the coastal waters off South Vietnam. Because of the magnitude of this traffic, which consists primarily of fishing and coastal vessels, it is very difficult to detect North Vietnamese or Viet Cong craft which might be engaged in infiltrating new supplies or moving supplies previously landed. Since at least 5 to 10 percent of the 50,000 commercial craft registered with the South Vietnamese government are off the coast on any given day, the problems involved in detecting any planned infiltration movements are formidable. Although the South Vietnamese navy searches approximately 130 junks each day, sightings may run as high as 5,000 junks

and large sampans per day during good weather. Thus the potential for infiltration by coastal junks is very large. The primary problem in detecting infiltration or Viet Cong sea activity remains identification of craft. Infiltrating junks can cover their activity by mingling with coastal traffic or remaining well out to sea and making landfalls with the fishing fleets as they make their normal daily movements.

Types and Quantities of Supplies Moved

52. The types of military supplies that have entered South Vietnam by sea have included weapons, ammunition, food, clothing, and medical supplies. Although available evidence does not permit a precise determination of total shipments moved by sea in any given year, it appears that sea infiltration has provided an important means of supply to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. However, the sporadic nature of sea movements, the infrequency of detection, and the small number of voyages by any given craft in the course of a year, make it very difficult to establish an order of magnitude for shipments by sea. It is quite possible also that the pattern of sea infiltration has changed during 1965. The absence of any further incidents involving steel-hulled infiltration ships since the Vung Ro sinking in February suggests that the Viet Cong may now be using only smaller craft which are more easily concealed. Reports of incidents of sea infiltration involving junks have continued in 1965. Small craft of this type probably could make one trip a month for 9 months of the year between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. (High seas during the last quarter of the year make it impractical for small craft to be used for infiltration during that period.)

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If only 5 small craft were directly involved in sea infiltration and if each craft carried only 8 tons of supplies, a total of 360 tons could be transported during the year, or approximately one ton per day on an annual basis. Normally this amount would be sufficient to stock or restock several storage areas. Steel-hulled ships or the larger junks used for infiltration could carry 50 to 100 tons per trip. Even one or two successful deliveries by ships of this type would add substantially to the amount of materials infiltrated in any given year.

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V. INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM CAMBODIA

Supply Routes

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53. Some supplies for the Viet Cong have entered South Vietnam from Cambodia, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Most of these supplies and materials were either indigenous to Cambodia or arrived in Cambodia through normal trade channels. From Cambodia supplies have been moved into South Vietnam by the following routes and methods: (a) by sampan or junk on the inland waterways; (b) by porters on the trails that approach or cross the South Vietnamese border; and (c) by sampan or junk from Cambodian ports to islands in the Gulf of Siam and to the west coast of South Vietnam. A substantial open but illegal trade has also been taking place between South Vietnam and Cambodia, especially in the Mekong delta. The general locations of the major routes are indicated on the map at Annex. Many points along the border between Cambodia and South Vietnam have been reported as Viet Cong border crossings, but Tay Ninh and Chau Doc ^{10/} have been the two provinces most often cited. The relative importance of each area, route, or mode cannot be determined from available information. It appears, however, that the Viet Cong have shifted back and forth from land to water transport and from one area of entry to another as the need and

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^{10/} Formerly part of An Giang Province.

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tactical situation have changed.

54. Use of inland water transport to cross the border seems to have been much more important in the southern and delta area than in the northeastern part of Cambodia. Four inland water routes -- the Se San, the Sre Pok, and its two tributaries -- provide access from Cambodia to Kontum, Pleiku, and Darlac Provinces in the central area. These waterways can accommodate small native craft only, and, although few reports are available to indicate that the Viet Cong have used these water routes, their possible importance is accentuated by the scarcity of roads serving the area. There are six waterways, including the Mekong, that provide access to the southern or delta area. For the most part, these southern rivers can be navigated by craft as large as small oceangoing steamers. Smaller waterways provide connections to most points in the delta area.

55. Water transport on the Mekong-Bassac River complex was one of the major means of moving supplies from Cambodia into South Vietnam as late as 1964. During 1963 a significant quantity of supplies, particularly potassium chlorate, a chemical used in making explosives, was captured by South Vietnamese and Cambodian patrols on the rivers, but since that year reported seizures of supplies on the rivers have practically ceased. This situation may mean that the Viet Cong have developed other water transport routes or are relying more heavily on land routes. A shift from water to land transport was revealed in 1964 in a captured document from the Finance and Economic Section of Chau Thanh District Party Committee of Tay Ninh Province which stated that its transport units had to

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use cross-country land routes because movements by water were often stopped and searched. The use of water transport by the Viet Cong undoubtedly has continued, however, because some areas can be reached only by water transport or by a combination of land and water transport. A description of a logistic system on a river route was revealed by a Vietnamese junk crew that was captured in 1963 on the Mekong River near the border. The chemicals that they were carrying were smuggled from Phnom Penh by water to a point within 1 mile of the border. The chemicals were then transferred to small junks of 2 or 3 tons capacity that were manned by personnel hired to take the junks downstream at night to about 5 miles below the border from where other crews took over. The materials were well camouflaged in sacks under layers of sand, salt, or fruit or in false bottoms and tops of the boats. Another informant stated that the Viet Cong manned the boats themselves when certain materials such as rifles and ammunition were being transported.

56. Land routes provide access at many points along the Cambodian border for Viet Cong cadres, supporters, or purchasing agents to obtain supplies as necessary. Four of the major land routes that enter South Vietnam through Tay Ninh Province have been used to transport weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Two routes enter the province from the north, one from the west, and one from the south. The Viet Cong, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] have assembled as many as 300 porters at one time to carry their supplies across the border. Evidence exists that before crossing the

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border the porters have left the roads and fanned out onto the complex of trails to portage their loads. In other cases purchasing agents have mingled with the local traffic that crosses the border by vehicle or on foot. Chau Doc Province, located on the south side of the Mekong, is another area through which supply routes pass.

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57. Seaborne infiltration operations from Cambodia have originated at the port of Kampot or on the coast between Kampot and the border of South Vietnam. Some materials infiltrated from Cambodia have been carried first to Phu Du, Phu Quoc, or one of the other nearby islands, and finally to the western coast of South Vietnam.

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Organizational Control

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58. the infiltration of supplies from Cambodia is under the control of the Viet Cong Peoples

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Revolutionary Party apparatus in the border area. Such a party component is the above-mentioned Finance and Economic Section of the Chau Thanh District Party Committee of Tay Ninh Province. This section may be only one of many such organizations along the border or it may be the principal one that serves the Central Office, South Vietnam.

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the section was composed of a section chief with his deputy and five helpers and three units or cells. One unit consisted of five men who recruited seven Cambodians and four Vietnamese tradesmen to purchase goods in Cambodia and three other men who were only in charge of purchases of goods from local markets. Another unit consisted of a village organized into five water transport units and twelve land transport units. The third was a motorboat cell. In May 1964 the section purchased in Cambodia about 15 tons of supplies, including many types of food, cloth, dry-cell batteries, electric wire, and medicine. In addition the list of purchased items included about 90 animals.

Types of Supplies Moved

59. It appears that supplies procured in or through Cambodia have generally consisted of materials that can be purchased on the open market, although some arms and ammunition may also have been procured clandestinely. There is evidence that Viet Cong units located in areas adjacent to the Cambodian border north of the Mekong delta have on occasion in the past purchased substantial quantities of food in Cambodia. However, Cambodia is by no means a major source of

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food supplies to the Viet Cong who depend almost entirely on the Vietnamese countryside and population for their subsistence. There is also reliable evidence that the Viet Cong clandestine apparatus in Phnom Penh has regularly purchased drugs and medical supplies in the open market in Cambodia to be smuggled into South Vietnam. Also, there are indications that some radios, batteries, and tubes have been procured in Cambodia. Although an appreciable amount of Viet Cong medical and other supplies for areas near the Cambodian border have been procured in Cambodia, most of these items have apparently been procured in South Vietnam or brought from North Vietnam.

60. There are reliable reports to the effect that the Viet Cong apparatus in Phnom Penh has raised some funds for the Viet Cong by soliciting contributions from Vietnamese minority elements in Cambodia generally unsympathetic to the government of South Vietnam. However, these contributions were small compared to the large amounts obtained through the variety of taxes levied on the Vietnamese population in South Vietnam.

61. It is clear that the Viet Cong have procured certain chemicals in Cambodia, such as potassium chlorate, that are used for making explosives. Since the spring of 1964, however, reported seizures of strategic chemicals in the Mekong-Bassac River complex have practically ceased. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Whether these developments indicate that the Viet Cong are no longer procuring these materials in or through

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Cambodia or that they have improved their ability to bring in supplies without detection cannot be determined.

62. The extent to which Cambodia is used either as a transfer area or as a source of arms and ammunition is far less clear. In recent years, several reports of varying reliability have indicated that arms have been moved from Cambodia to South Vietnam. Circumstantial evidence, including the negative testimony of numerous Viet Cong prisoners who were engaged in supply operations from Cambodia and the difficulty that the Viet Cong would experience in moving large numbers of arms through Cambodia undetected, suggests that such movements probably are small in terms of the total amount of such material infiltrated into South Vietnam.

Viet Cong Bases in Cambodian Territory

63. There is considerable evidence that the Viet Cong have used Cambodian territory in some areas along the 600-mile border for sanctuary and bivouac purposes for varying periods of time. There is also some evidence, although this remains less clear, that they have established temporary military facilities, such as rest camps, training areas, hospitals, workshops, and storage depots on Cambodia soil. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In addition, major Viet Cong party and military headquarters, such as elements of the Central Office South Vietnam, Headquarters of Military Region VIII, the Region VIII Committee, and Headquarters of the PAVN 325th Division occasionally have been located on

Cambodian soil

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Cambodian Government Collusion

64. There is no question that the Cambodian government has taken an attitude increasingly favorable to the Communists in the Vietnamese situation. The Cambodian government has expressed its official goodwill diplomatically and politically for the NFLSV, but stated that Cambodian neutrality forbids its operational and logistic cooperation. Sihanouk has made public statements supporting the NFLSV's claim to represent the Vietnamese people, he has presented medical supplies to the victims of American bombing in North Vietnam, and he has presided at a ceremony in which medical supplies were presented to a representative of the NFLSV. He also participated in negotiations concerning the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border with representatives of North Vietnam and the Front in December 1964, though he was disappointed in these negotiations as neither the Front nor Hanoi was willing to give him the border guarantees he desired.

65. There is no hard evidence, however, that the central Cambodian government has actively or knowingly provided logistic support to the Viet Cong, beyond the gift of medical supplies mentioned above. There is no conclusive evidence that Communist arms being brought in openly through Sihanoukville are intended for other than the Cambodian armed forces, although it is conceivable that some may have ultimately gone to the Viet Cong. It is also possible that the Cambodian Ministry of

Commerce knowingly assisted the Viet Cong by granting licenses to Cambodian firms to import explosive materials in excess of domestic needs for eventual diversion to the Viet Cong. The Cambodian government did, however, seize a shipment of potassium chlorate moving down the Mekong in September 1963 and turned the confiscated material over to the royal palace for the manufacture of fireworks.

66. There is evidence of cooperation with the Viet Cong at lower Cambodian government and military levels. In some areas along the border, the Viet Cong are apparently permitted to take refuge from South Vietnamese military forces, at times apparently with the active assistance of Cambodian armed forces. There have even been some low-level reports of Cambodian and Viet Cong troops fighting together against South Vietnamese troops, and Viet Cong prisoners of war in 1964 stated that the Cambodian troops attempted to cover up their cooperation with the insurgents.

Prisoners have also reported that local Cambodian authorities have made no effort to interfere with Viet Cong procurement of supplies in Cambodia.

At the same time, however,

in some areas the Cambodians have tried to police the border against Viet Cong as well as South Vietnamese troops.

instances of fire-fights between Cambodian and Viet Cong intruders so far this year. Moreover, a recent Cambodian directive sent to border outposts urging extreme vigilance against illicit rice shipments to South Vietnam indicates that for the first time authorities in Phnom Penh are taking cognizance of border problems and are attempting

to rectify the situation.

67. In sum, the Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory is due to active Cambodian cooperation in some areas, a "laissez-faire" attitude in others, and the simple inability of the Cambodian government to control or even patrol its frontiers, particularly in isolated regions. Central government policy, while generally favorable to the Viet Cong, stops short of active support.

VI. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES

Organizational Control

68. Internal distribution of infiltrated supplies and transportation of locally procured goods are basic elements of the Viet Cong logistics network. Viet Cong emphasis on the importance of local self-sufficiency testifies to efforts to reduce the internal logistics task. On the other hand, the existence of known internal logistics operations confirms that the requirements for internal distribution and transportation are substantial.

69. Viet Cong logistics operations are organized at all levels from the Central Office, South Vietnam, to the village Party chapter. At every major echelon of the Party, the Viet Cong have a route protection or communications-liaison section whose mission is to establish, maintain, and supervise safe corridor routes for the flow of men, materiel, and messages. For security reasons, the Viet Cong appear to maintain separate routes for these transport tasks with the organizational subordination of any given task determined by the nature and importance of the task. The route protection and communications-liaison section of the Party exercises a crucial role in approving and safeguarding all types of logistics support operations. An estimated 2,000 or more Party cadre are probably directly associated with the communications-liaison function as guides, security personnel, station attendants, and supervisory personnel. In general, these sections supervise the work of the two basic transport organizations -- the Rear Services

transport units and the Finance and Economic transport units.

70. Special and organic transport elements directed by the Rear Services Section are found at all military echelons from the Central Office, South Vietnam, to local (regular) forces. The military elements of the Central Office, South Vietnam, and the Viet Cong military regions control special military transport units which appear to be primarily concerned with the receipt and redistribution of infiltrated supplies. About 5,800 personnel are associated with these special military transport units subject to region or Central Office level control, according to the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam. In addition, every military echelon of the main and local forces has an organic transport element under its Rear Services Section to provide logistic support for its military and non-military requirements. An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 personnel are associated with these organic transport units.

71. The second basic element involved in internal distribution and transport consists of the transport units of the Finance and Economic Section of the Party. These transport units appear to be generally responsible for transferring goods acquired locally to depots established within their area. In most cases, it is believed that the organized transport element of the Finance and Economic element is relatively small and is primarily responsible for recruiting local civilian personnel to accomplish movement of supplies. In some cases, however, where the movement of civilian-type goods is substantial, non-military transport units have been permanently established under the Finance and Economic Section.

About 2,000 personnel are probably permanently associated with transport elements of the Finance and Economic Section.

Redistribution Routes and Storage Areas

72. Personnel, infiltrators, and supplies acquired from both internal and external sources are moved over a fairly well-established network of protected routes within the Viet Cong-controlled areas of South Vietnam. The network includes an interconnected system of depots and way stations all the way from Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces in the north to the Ca Mau peninsula in the south. There are two roughly parallel north-south corridors, one of which closely follows the western border of the country and is used mainly for personnel. The other corridor is located nearly midway between the coast and the western border and extends from the highland region above the Do Xa base area to War Zone "D" northeast of Saigon. It is probably used for both personnel and materiel. These two corridors have several lateral routes leading east and west to and from infiltration points along the coast and the Laos and Cambodian borders. Both internal main corridors connect with the Central Office, South Vietnam, base areas in Tay Ninh Province north of Saigon. Here the Central Office, South Vietnam, apparently maintains the principal agency for coordinating operations over the entire system. This has been identified as the Postal Transportation and Communication Branch. The Tay Ninh base in turn forms the principal connection with at least three other corridors including the remainder of the network which forms a loop within the Mekong delta region. See the map at Annex

for location of the Viet Cong war zones, storage areas, and main redistribution corridors, and annex D for organizational chart.

73. Study of the routes, when plotted in detail on a map, shows that this logistic network relies heavily on overland movement and that the principal motorable roads are generally not used. Principal waterways are used, however, in the delta region and several land routes follow streams (probably for guidance at night). It is also noted that a major portion of the network is located at or near provincial boundaries where South Vietnamese surveillance may be least effective. Comparison of this network with a map of the current status of pacification shows that a considerable part of the transport system runs through unsecured territory which may be controlled by the South Vietnamese in the daytime but is used by the Viet Cong at night when most of their supply movements take place.

74. Supply depots which would normally have a nominal capacity of from 5 to 10 tons of supplies each are sometimes connected with the way stations and are controlled by the appropriate logistic organization. Although classes of supplies in these depots are usually mixed, some contain only weapons and ammunition, and some handle food exclusively. A typical depot may be described as consisting of a small cluster of huts or shelters surrounded by a security fence and occasionally an automatic weapons emplacement, all well concealed under foliage. A minimum of traffic is allowed at the depot, deliveries by transport units being made at some distance from the depot with final haul and storage made by

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the depot cadre. [] supplies are moved in stages and handled through as many depots as necessary to insure their security and to build up a reserve for support of an engagement by Viet Cong forces. In 1963, when Viet Cong forces in the central highlands were considerably smaller than at present, food depots were limited to a maximum of 5 tons because of the threat of South Vietnamese government action. Although the size of these depots has probably been increased, the fragmentation of storage areas is a basic constraint on the initiation of large-scale Viet Cong actions.

75. Because the communications-liaison routes often run across open country or over back roads and the Viet Cong do not possess any sizeable inventory of motor trucks, much of the shipment of supplies is handled by teams of porters provided by the local village and district Viet Cong organizations. Other forms of transport have also been utilized in significant amounts in the lowlands and in the delta region, including trains of oxcarts, river and coastal water craft, "hired" three-wheeler Lambretta-type motorcycle carriers, and occasionally commandeered cargo trucks. Movements by the transport units are secured by route protection forces usually assigned from local guerrilla units. These security troops may conduct raids near the routes as a diversion to screen movements of supplies over more exposed sectors.

76. It has been impossible to estimate the volume of supplies handled over internal Viet Cong supply routes. One set of pertinent figures, however, has become available in documentation concerning the

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supply corridor from Kien Hoa to Tay Ninh. Possibly referring to performance in 1964, one Viet Cong official had entered in his notes that this corridor had handled over 200 tons of "strategic" goods and 31 tons of "party" goods on shipments from probable coastal delivery points in Kien Hoa Province to War Zone "C" over a distance of approximately 120 miles and passing within 30 miles of Saigon.

ANNEX A

TYPES OF COMMUNIST-SUPPLIED AND LOCALLY PRODUCED WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION
CAPTURED FROM THE VIET CONG
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

1. Communist China

a. Weapons:

7.62-mm Pistol, Model 54
7.62-mm Semi-automatic carbine, Model 56 (copy of Soviet SKS)
7.62-mm Carbine, Model 53 (copy of Soviet M44)
7.62-mm Assault rifle, Model 56 (copy of Soviet AK)
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model 50
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model K50
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun (copy of Soviet PPSH) VC modified
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 53 (copy of Soviet DP)
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPD)
7.62-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 58 (copy of Soviet GORYUNOV)
7.92-mm Light machinegun (copy of BRNO)
7.92-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 24 (copy of Soviet MAXIM)
12.7-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 54 (copy of Soviet DShK)
40-mm Grenade launcher, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPG-2)
57-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 36
75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 52 (copy of US M20)
75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 56
Flame thrower (tentatively CHICOM)

60-mm Mortar, Model 31

82-mm Mortar

90-mm AT Rocket launcher, Model 51

b. Ammunition:

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model P

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 50

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 53

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 56

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model L

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model API B32

7.92-mm Cartridge

12.7-mm Cartridge

40-mm Grenade, PG-2

60-mm Shell, mortar

82-mm Shell, mortar

75-mm Shell, Recoilless gun

2. USSR

a. Weapons:

7.62-mm Carbine, Model M44

7.62-mm Rifle, Model M1891

7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model PPSH 41

7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model RP46

23-mm Cannon

b. Ammunition:

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model P

7.62-mm Cartridge, API, Model B-32

3. Czechoslovakiaa. Weapons:

7.65-mm Pistol, Model M1927, N B46

b. Ammunition (sample of each type exploited):

7.92-mm Cartridge, rifle

7.92-mm Cartridge, Mauser

4. Viet Cong-Produced Materiela. Weapons and Explosive Devices:

Skyhorse (VC-Type Bazooka)

Grenade launcher

AA Machinegun (modified from US .50-caliber MG)

AT Parachute hand grenade

Bicycle mine

Mine delay firing device

Shaped charge (2 types)

Shaped mine, short cone type

Hollow cone mine, non-electric

AP mine, cylindrical type

AP fragmentation grenades (2 types)

AT mine, cast iron fragmentation

AT mine (constructed from British 100-mm mortar shell)

AT mine, iron case, cylindrical

AT mine, wooden, box type

Mine, turtle shaped, cement

Mine, turtle shaped, sheet metal

Mine, betel box shaped, cement

Mine, round volume type, sheet metal

Mine, round mound type, cement

Mine, 81-mm mortar container

Fixed directional fragmentation mine, Model DH-10

Incendiary grenade, sodium

Chemical firing device

AP mine, match box size

Antenna detonating device

ANNEX B

COMMUNIST TRUCK TRAFFIC REPORTED BY OBSERVERS ON
 SELECTED ROUTES IN SOUTHERN LAOS
 DECEMBER 1964 - JUNE 1965

Route Number and Month	Number of Trucks Reported Moving		Number of Days Covered by Reports	Average Number of Trucks Moving Per Day a/	
	South	North		South	North
<u>Route 23 b/</u>					
December 1964 c/	185	12	5	37	2
January 1965	337	324	22	15	15
February 1965	311	172	27	12	6
March 1965 d/	481	658	30	16	22
April 1965	640	775	30	21	26
May 1965	340	541	24	14	23
Total	<u>2,294</u>	<u>2,482</u>	<u>138</u>	17	18
<u>Route 92 e/</u>					
February 1965	13	15	19	0.7	0.8
March 1965	11	12	21	0.5	0.6
April 1965	66	58	20	3.3	2.9
May 1965	27	35	26	1.0	1.3
1-5 June 1965	7	7	5	1.4	1.4
Total	<u>124</u>	<u>127</u>	<u>91</u>	1.4	1.4

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ANNEX C

METHODS OF PACKAGING AND
TRANSPORTING SUPPLIES

1. Supplies are packaged in boxes, crates, bags, or other means normally used for market transactions or in sizes, shapes, and weights that can be handled by one porter. Listed below are some of the methods used:


- a. Rice in 220-pound fiber bags or sacks.
- b. Rice in 22-pound to 33-pound tubular cloth sacks carried over the shoulder or across the back.
- c. Salt in bags or sacks.
- d. Ammunition in squared, wooden boxes or cases, about 50 pounds each.
- e. Shoulder weapons wrapped in oil soaked rags or waterproof paper.
- f. Fuel in standard barrels or in cans of about 5 gallons each.
- g. Fish in cans or dried and salted in sacks.
- h. Meat, usually dried, in sacks.
- i. Clothing in sacks.
- j. Medicines in bottles or syrettes, in sizes that can be concealed on a person.
- k. Chemicals: saltpeter in 220-pound units; sulphur in 110-pound to 220-pound units; acid in less than one-quart bottles; mercury in containers weighting about 22 pounds.

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2. Transportation methods vary but are generally as follows:
- a. By vehicles -- car or truck.
 - b. By human porters with 40-pound to 60-pound load in back packs or shoulder poles, traveling in teams of 10 to 100 men.
 - c. Single or dual bicycles with up to 500-pound loads, traveling in teams of up to 30 men.
 - d. Horses and mules (seldom reported) with loads of 150 to 300 pounds.
 - e. Bull carts with 1,500 pounds.
 - f. Sampans with up to 1,500 pounds.
 - g. Motor carts (3-wheel) with 500 pounds.
 - h. Junks and oceangoing ships.

ANNEX D

ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERNAL VIET CONG LOGISTICS NETWORK



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